p. 762-767

The unification of Germany was by no means a certain event. There were many variables to prevent its occurrence: the diversity and traditional independence of the states, the reluctance of Europe to let a new, powerful state upset the balance of power, Austria fighting for influence and control in the same sphere. Bismarck's masterful planning and twisting of situations to his own advantage led him to a top-down approach. He started wars and played on people's fear and nationalism to create a Prussian empire; he brought states under a Prussian kaiser and government as a result of manipulating their fears about the balance of power. The southern German states chose to become a German Empire (under Prussian control) partly because they did not want to be invaded by France and partly because Bismarck had successfully appealed to their nationalism as offended Germans. With no Austria to protect them and the incentive to prevent France from upsetting the balance of power by "attacking" Prussia, the southern states let themselves be annexed into a Prussian empire, giving even more power to Bismarck.

p. 767-781

In the question of serfdom, our book says that it was agreed in Russia that the emancipation of serfs would lead to a modern state. It was supported both by westernizers and Slavophiles, the former because it would bring Russia morely fully into the Western liberal tradition, the latter because they so idealized peasant life. I think then it was more the desire for both, to be a Western state and an Eastern one, that led the tsar to emancipate the serfs in the manner that he did. It is remarkable that Alexander II chose to end serfdom, as it singled unmistakably a departure from the old ways of Russia and the tsar's dependence on the nobility. While he may have been worried about the serfs' effect on Russia's appearance abroad and ability to conduct successful wars, it is nonethless interesting that he should end it so abruptly, and by a special decree. At the same time, however, as we discussed in class, Alexander realized that it wasn't really intended to "free" the serfs, but instead to maintain the old system under a different name. Thus Russia hedged its bets, proving to the rest of Europe that it was a modern nation without slavery while still maintaining its old reliance on the nobility. The abolition of serfdom allowed the Russians to look upon themselves as an Enlightened state, instituting reforms that had no real meaning as they had in the past under Catherine the Great. They could combine their history of nobility with an acceptance by the rest of Europe to get what they hoped would be the best of both worlds.

Mia's post about this week's theme of nationalism has led me to contemplate further why it is that the U.S.'s "melting pot" has always been considered one of its strengths. I agree that this country began its history with a Western European identity, which successive waves of immigrants were gradually assimilated into. But these days, the analogy of a salad bowl as been put forth as more accurate. The sheer size of the US and its ability to have space enough for everyone who wishes to come allows for more wiggle room as different groups--religious, ethnic, political--settle in. I would say that the concept of the United States is a work in progress, and that's what makes us different. Our Constitution was designed to be changed and amended according to changing needs as the country developed. It is constantly be re-worked, as we have seen with the election of our new President, and that is a process that all Americans can contribute to. We are shaped by our immigrant citizens as much by our Daughters of the American Revolution. As we said, nationalism is the love of the idea of a nation. "America" still stands for something to its citizens (if not to the rest of the world), namely democracy and rights. Call me idealistic, but I think that is something that people from all walks of life can share.

Regarding Italian Unification (p.754-762)

I was impressed by how simple the book made the success of Italian unification seem. Cavour and Garibaldi had such apparently different ideologies and strategies that it is difficult to see one submitting to the other. And yet, that is what occurred. The crafted conservative state won the day, and the result seemed to please the Italians involved. Each of the major players' movements depended upon the other: without Garibaldi to weaken French control in the south, Cavour would never have entirely unified Italy. Without the scrupulously planned expansion of Piedmont-Sardinia by Cavour in the north, Italy would not have had a sovereign or a government ready for rule after unification, or its large territory in the north. Their collaboration, the popularity of the cause, and the universal acceptance of Victor Emmanuel greatly smoothed Italy's nation-state path. Garibaldi had the popularity and the troops to perhaps try to further Mazzini's populist republican dreams, but it turns out that he was a pragmatist. He remained faithful to the idea of nationhood and actually gave up his power to see that happen. Cavour, as the book states, "preferred that Italian unification happen quickly...without domestic turmoil or mess, unpredictable negotiations with other Italian states" (762). Remarkably, he got his wish. His plan went according to plan, even with the tricky variables of French unalliances, Austrian encroachment, the Pope, and Garibaldi. Though the more rural south resented how the government was situated in and mainly concerned with the north, the type of government and the idea that Italy should, in fact, be unified, seemed to have been more universally accepted than not. The main difference lay in the style of achieving such a government.

Reading 732-742

The contrast between France's revolutions and England's reforms shows through the way their respective governments dealt with radicals marching in the streets. The book states that during the revolution of 1830, "three days of intense street battles followed in which the revolutionaries, fight behind hastily constructed barricades, defied the army and the police, neither of which was willing to fire into the crowds" (732). The apparent reluctance of these forces to use violence meant that the revolutionaries, who did not shy from fighting, had the upper hand in the streets. Their civilian status protected them, and they did not fear government authority, making the revolution moderately successful. Government authority in Great Britain, however, carried much more weight among radical fighters. The militia cavalry charge at St. Peter's Field in 1819, which resulted in civilian casualties, as well as the Six Acts, which restricted freedom of speech and assembly, shows that the British government was much more willing to crack down swiftly and harshly on radical elements and then gradually reform once the situation was contained. Government forces then seemed to inspire much more fear, as in the Chartist movement. The mobilization of troops under the famous Duke of Wellington to prevent a march on Parliament forced the Chartists into second thoughts: "Rain, poor management, and unwillingness on the part of many to do battle with the well-armed constabulary put an end to the Chartists' campaign" (736). The discipline of the government forces made them a much more formidable foe.

In the Depths of Despair

An interesting thing about this post and its subsequent comments is the idea of how, even if you invest in your work to lead a more comfortable life, you are obliged to succeed according to the desires set forth by society. There are very few people who work solely for themselves, with no hint of outside approval- it is simply too uncomfortable, and the sort of socially mobile society we live in was built around human needs for security, as Declan said. There is a specific vision of success that we work for, a vision that can "blind" us from seeing how we truly live. To a certain extent, however, we can only be fooled by a false vision for so long.
"He would be too blinded by opportunity to note or care about his state of being. Furthermore, even if he did take note that he lived a miserable life devoted solely to wage labor, he would be able to justify this life in his belief that he will soon be rewarded for his labor with a more stable and pleasant position in society." Marx believed that the workers would come into a self-consciousness, where they could see the true slavery of their existence. If the worker has been pushed to edge of his tolerance, and is truly working for subsistence with no hope of promotion, then there must come despair and an attempt to change the system. There is no hope of a reward in a wage labor system, only the survival from day to day. If conditions hit rock bottom, a situation I personally cannot even imagine myself in, ambition to succeed with the system as is will falter, and the urge to reform the system (or even replace it) will grow. The scenario you put forth can only work if people believe that there is a way up. If they see no way up, they have nothing to lose.
"When work is seen as a means to an end, the workers labor will seize to be Marx’s “forced” labor but instead be voluntary labor, as the worker imagines his labor helping fulfill his vision of a better life." I think the key word here is "imagines." If the vision that the laborer sees turns out not to be real, will he not in turn be disillusioned? I am not arguing that a revolution is inevitable, but I do think a situation where society is not fluid and does not even appear to yield to amibition should be more carefully considered. Americans have their Dream, but others may not.

Metternich's Peace

With regards to Laura's post about Metternich's desire for peace, I would say that "peace" is an imprecise word to use on Coffin's part. Metternich was concerned with maintaining a conservative status quo and the balance of power among the powerful European states. Napoleon and his conquering ways had gravely upset that balance, and the purpose of the Congress of Vienna was to bring the countries back into alignment. While some part of it may have focused on punishing France, they were still allowed a relatively moderate settlement; what was more important was not provoking a French backlash. France was put back in its place, but was still necessary to sustain equilibrium.
Metternich wanted the balance of power to come from legitimate rulers, who claimed the throne by heritage and tradition, and if that legitimate power was threatened, he believed strongly in intervention, which would of course require a military force to suppress the revolt. He saw the need to, as the book says, "keep a firm grip on domestic affairs," a turn of phrase that does not suggest the sedateness of peace, but active participants always in military readiness. Peace is not a dynamic enough word to describe the fluctuations of power that Metternich would have recognized as necessarily occurring if a balance were to be maintained in Europe.

http://letstalkaboutmeh.blogspot.com/

Karl Marx's theory of socialism

Marx's socialist theory portrayed communism as the ultimate resting place of a dialectical class conflict, rising from the capitalist revolution and collapse. Communism needs capitalism, just as capitalism needed feudalism. The new society arises out of conflict and class struggles; a true communist state cannot be instituted by a body on high. The workers themselves must first come to terms with their situation as capitalism collapses: while a capitalist state still functions, the workers have no need to assess their state. Only when destruction is staring them in the face will they reorganize into something radically different. Communism as Marx sees comes from the collapse of the previous system, as the people of the state as a whole make a conscious decision to move away from the instability of capitalism. But they need to see that instability for themselves, they need to struggle in order to see the true value of communism. Also, Marx's theory incorporates a dialectical view of history, so it is interesting that he sees society as coming to a halt with communism. If the state progressed from feudalism to capitalism to communism, did Marx really think that the social and economic forces that drove history would disappear in a so-called perfect state? (Coffin, 722)

Greek Independence

The war for Greek independence from the Ottoman Empire was a conflict that encapsulated the coming together of different spheres in European life and how, despite wars and conflicts, there were a few traits that Europeans still shared. While they feared each other's territorial advances, they feared an "outside" force even more, and the Ottomans represented such a force to them. They banded together in sympathy for the Greeks, whom they viewed as of Europe, against a common enemy, the Turks. The war was seen as a defense of Western civilization, so it is no surprise that poets and painters such as Byron and Delacroix participated in the conflict or immortalized it in art. The Romantic culture of the time fostered sympathy for the Greeks because of the shared artistic and cultural history, a history that Europeans in general embraced as generally European, and not separated into countries or territories. The Greeks were heavily supported by volunteers because their cause was just European enough to warran it: they had the same religion, a shared culture, and a common enemy who was a threat to European territory.