Regarding Italian Unification (p.754-762)

I was impressed by how simple the book made the success of Italian unification seem. Cavour and Garibaldi had such apparently different ideologies and strategies that it is difficult to see one submitting to the other. And yet, that is what occurred. The crafted conservative state won the day, and the result seemed to please the Italians involved. Each of the major players' movements depended upon the other: without Garibaldi to weaken French control in the south, Cavour would never have entirely unified Italy. Without the scrupulously planned expansion of Piedmont-Sardinia by Cavour in the north, Italy would not have had a sovereign or a government ready for rule after unification, or its large territory in the north. Their collaboration, the popularity of the cause, and the universal acceptance of Victor Emmanuel greatly smoothed Italy's nation-state path. Garibaldi had the popularity and the troops to perhaps try to further Mazzini's populist republican dreams, but it turns out that he was a pragmatist. He remained faithful to the idea of nationhood and actually gave up his power to see that happen. Cavour, as the book states, "preferred that Italian unification happen quickly...without domestic turmoil or mess, unpredictable negotiations with other Italian states" (762). Remarkably, he got his wish. His plan went according to plan, even with the tricky variables of French unalliances, Austrian encroachment, the Pope, and Garibaldi. Though the more rural south resented how the government was situated in and mainly concerned with the north, the type of government and the idea that Italy should, in fact, be unified, seemed to have been more universally accepted than not. The main difference lay in the style of achieving such a government.