Kraftwerk

Kraftwerk is German for power station, and that tells you a little bit about this famous band's focus, namely industry and technology. With vocoder singing, an electronic, catchy sound, and huge projected images and words behind them, Kraftwerk had an entirely new aesthetic for their time. The extensive use of technology in their music and performances suggests an appreciation for modern electronics, an appreciation which contrasts with sometimes pessimistic lyrics ("Stop radioactivity") about the modern age.

This quote from this article I think really encapsulates what Kraftwerk, and other German bands, were about:"They were not the first band to make music with electronic keyboards, but they were probably the first musicians to fuse those innovations with pop melody (for better and for worse). When they pursued that fusion, they...replaced conventional drumming with electronic rhythms, or, better, the essence of Afro-American civilization with the essence of European civilization." The German music scene in the 1960s and '70s was all about finding a European and distinctly German musical culture amid the influx and prevalence of Ango-American rhythms and melodies. Kraftwerk, for one, refused to allow American rhythmic influences from jazz and rock to be the defining trademark of German music; instead, they used it as a jumping-off point to incorporate more of a European, electronic sensibility.



Also, check out their website. It can provide hours of entertainment.

Krautrock, Faust, and the new German identity

Krautrock was the name given by British followers to German experimental music that emerged in the postwar era. It was not a name widely embraced by German musicians. It encompassed a large trend in popular music, where German musicians were combining what they knew of American rock and roll with their own classical musical history (Stockhausen's experiments with electronica, for instance) to create something new. As one Faust member put it, "We were trying to put aside everything we had heard in rock 'n' roll, the three-chord pattern, the lyrics. We had the urge of saying something completely different." Various bands, including Tangerine Dream, Faust, and Kraftwerk, incorporated the avant-garde styles of the classical music world, which were playing with electronic sounds to create music that interacted directly with space, into a new approach to music that both utilized rock and roll and eschewed it.
A quote about Faust: "These teutonic vampires injected angst, like burning lava, into a sound that was deliberately fastidious, repulsive, incoherent." I'm not sure how accurate this is, but Faust is a remarkable band. They really exemplified the mish-mash experimental style of West German music at the time, combining rock and electronica into a unique German sound and perspective on music's effects. With a surrealist bent, they were not afraid to push the envelope with 14 minute long songs that were mainly drumming (Schempal) or that used guitars, tambourines, and electric drills in a looped, pulsating beat that is oddly fascinating (Krautrock). The song Krautrock starts out simply and just builds and builds on itself with new instrumentation and rhythms. Faust is one example of a band that took Western music and made a German movement out of it, coming as they did at the confluence of new developments in German classical music and in the German political sphere.
History of Rock Music: Faust
Krautrock

The Banana Bunker

The ability of Germany to transform itself is evident through the history of some of its cultural landmarks. The history of techno is interwoven with the rest of German cultural history and identity as the political, musical, and artistic scenes changed dramatically in the postwar and then the post-Wall era. The Banana Bunker of Berlin displays the varied history of Berlin and its dominant trends through its own use during the twentieth century. Built during the Second World War, it was originally intended as an air raid shelter and built by the infamous Albert Speer. When it ended up on the east side of the Berlin Wall, the Soviets used it as a prison for German soldiers. As the presence of the Soviet army diminished, the bunker came to be used as a storehouse for fruit imported from Cuba- hence the name "Banana Bunker". After the fall of the Wall, it became the city center for crazy techno raves until 1996. It stood unused until 2008, when Christian Boros decided to house his contemporary art collection, including works by Damien Hirst and Olafur Eliasson, there in a sort of museum. This transformation from utilitarian bunker to Soviet prison to fruit warehouse to techno party center to contemporary art museum reflects Germany's similar transformation in the latter half of the 20th century. The techno rave culture was an integral part of Berlin culture as Germans experienced the freedom of their own united state for the first time and felt free to experiment further with their music and the boundaries of their society. Techno was an important expression of cultural freedom to experiment.
Public Radio International piece on the Banana Bunker
Spiegel Online International article

West German Pavilion

The West German Pavilion, built to Stockhausen's specifications for the 1970 Osaka World's Fair, shows how much electronic music came to be associated with West Germany and the new and innovative techniques the West German electronic music world was taking to create new types of sounds and experiences of sound in space and interacting with space. It was a spherical building with fifty loudspeakers surrounding the audience in all directions, including from beneath the floor. The sound of the performers was manipulated through these speakers, sent in any pattern to give a sense of the music encircling the audience in any direction, or spiraling upwards, or layering. As the author Michael Forsyth describes it, "In Stockhausen's spherical building, the sounds move in space around the listener seated in his chair, giving him a liberated, floating sensation as he perpetually relates to and moves with the sounds; each person is able to relate to a number of different layers of sound at one time. The listener ceases to have a single viewpoint in music- this continually changes, like the different views of a single object in a cubist painting" (Buildings for Music, by Michael Forsyth, page 320; accessed here). Experimentation on such a large scale led to new sensations and a new conception of what music could do as it interacted with space around the listener. That is was called the West German Pavilion shows the attachment between West Germany and their experimental music, that they had created an art form that was distinctly German in its technicality and beauty.
For pictures of the West German Pavilion, see page 323 of Forsyth's book)
Kontakte, part 3, by Stockhausen

Karlheinz Stockhausen

One of the most influential and unique composers of the 20th century, Stockhausen not only was a large figure in the classical world, but also in the newly emerging popular electronic scene in Germany. Interested in acoustics and how the shape of the space or perspective in space could affect sound and experience of a performance, he explored serialism and chance music in addition to electronica, where he focused on the most basic aspect of music, sine waves, and their manipulation to create music. Electronic Study I (1953) was the first piece ever composed with sine-wave sounds. He was involved more directly in the electronic music scene when he served as artistic director for a number of years for the electronic music studio at West German Broadcasting (Westdeutscher Rundfunk), where he had the opportunity to choose the type of electronic music recorded and broadcast and oversee its development. His interest in "the integration of all concrete and abstract (synthetic) sound possibilities (also all noises), and the controlled projection of sound in space" (Stockhausen 1989b, 127, as quoted in the Wikipedia article), as a classical composer, no less, was greatly influential for popular bands in terms of musical choice and in terms of more widespread acceptance of electronic music. He played around with tones and waves and encouraged experimentation. Stockhausen's music is more intellectual, I think, than later bands which incorporated the Western rhythms and sounds of rock and roll, but both share an alien, other-worldly quality that conveys vast amounts of empty space stretching to infinity.

http://www.furious.com/perfect/ohm/wdr.html
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karlheinz_Stockhausen
Stockhausen, Karlheinz. 1989b. Towards a Cosmic Music. Texts selected and translated by Tim Nevill. Shaftsbury: Element Books. ISBN 1852300841

Tangerine Dream

Tangerine Dream, one of the most well-known German electronica bands, was built upon Surrealist roots: Edgar Froese, who was the founding member, met and was greatly influenced by Salvador Dali in that he turned towards more experimental styles of music. Froese was born in East Prussia during World War II, but moved to West Berlin to study traditional visual art. His background in art as well as an interest in technology led him towards a multimedia approach to music, often using custom-made instruments and synthesizers. This shows how at that time, artists of all kinds were migrating to West Berlin, and that many influences contributed to the German music scene. Tangerine Dream members also claim classical composers such as Stockhausen as influences, making German electronica more of a melting pot for all kinds of German music and other musical forms abroad. That both Dali and Stockhausen shaped a band that was influential itself illustrates the wide-range that German artists in the '60s drew upon to create their own style of music that was ethereal and dream-like to perhaps convey the absurdity they saw in their own existence.
Edgar Froese biography

DEMOGRAPHICS

Mongols brought the Black Plague to Russia, from whence it moved west
Black Plague--> killed 1/3 of European population-> people moved out of the cities
Renaissance--> population rebounded to pre-plague levels
--> time was peaceful and prosperous
--> religious wars, plague--> Italian population went down
Beginning of exponential population growth
New World--> colonized partly because of overpopulation
European marriage pattern: women married older, large percentage of women remained unmarried
French Revolution/Industrial Revolution
--> people moved from country to city (Enclosure Acts, etc.)
--> longer lifespans, but families still large
--> needed extra money- child workers, lots of babies
--> rise of the middle class
--> consumerism
population doubled between 1800-1900
Industrialization
-->cities ill-equipped for rapid pop expansion--> the Social Question
-->longer life span
-->vaccination for smallpox, sanitation, cheaper food
-->rising fertility (as opposed to falling mortality)
-->people married younger, bigger families
WWI-->loss of an entire generation of men
Great Depression-->migration, smaller families?
post-WWII-->baby boom

p. 1060-1071

Did corruption in the Arab world stem directly from Western influences (via colonialism)? Many Egyptian critics felt that the government was moving away from traditional family values and Islamic morals and that that was the reason for its moral bankruptcy and ineffectualness. The West had poisoned them with ideas brought through centuries of contact and dominance in the region, when colonial powers dictated the use of resources and the political situation in the country. In an effort to return the Middle East to a position of power, hard-liners rejected the idea of a secular government, seeing Islamic traditions as fundamental to running a good government. The most out-spoken critic in Egypt was Sayyid Qutb, whose experience in Egypt and America convinced him of the danger of Western influences on a Muslim state. As this Guardian article notes, his ideas of jihad, even against other, "westernized" Muslim leaders, lives on today in the ideology of Al Qaida. The author makes a point at the end of the article which illustrates the influence Qutb has today: though America was attacked by bin Laden and seems the primary target for Middle Eastern terrorist groups, they are rather seeking to expose and get rid of the corrupting influence in their own countries; their main goal is to bring Saudia Arabic, for instance, back into the strictly Islamic fold.

Gellner

I found Gellner's article fascinating and thought he made some very interesting claims. For instance, he baldly states, "Marxism, because it unites the political, ideological, and economic hierarchies, inevitably leads to totalitarianism." Perhaps because of my capitalist bias, I find myself agreeing with him. Communism demands total unification of society under the direction of the proletariat, and in complex societies, that means unification of political, ideological, and economic concerns. If everything is unified, what else can we get but a totalitarian state? I guess the question is, then, whether a totalitarian state is so bad if you're after the Marxist ideal. Marxism is portrayed in the article almost like a religion ("secular salvation"). The "rightness" of Marxism would mean that it necessarily controlled all aspects of society rigidly according to that standard. Gellner dismisses the method of salvation along with the fall of the Soviet Union with the argument that the USSR was diverse (culturally, politically, etc.), yet the salvation method stuck nowhere.
On another note, it's interesting that he predicted the invasion of Iraq almost 10 years before it happened.

Duma Session with Gorbachev

As we discussed in class, the most remarkable bit about this document is the fact that it exists. But a few years earlier, it is unthinkable that the president of the USSR would be defending communism and the Russian Communist Party to the Russian people. It also reveals a split in the country, that not all supported democracy when the USSR fell. Gorbachev's wording in his responses suggest that he believes in, or at least wants others to think he believes in, Lenin's version of communism, the Marxist homeland for the worker and peasant that has ideals for men and women to put their faith in, a place that is not a utopia but tries its best through collaboration. The animosity towards the Communist Party reminds me in a way of the debate happening today over Islam. Grouping extremists and fundamentalists in with the moderates or peaceful believers and punishing them all only serves to antagonize further. Gorbachev is trying to remind his interrogators that there is still a kind of socialism that is widely accepted and does not involve mass murder but simply the support of common people. Though the USSR performed terrible deeds in the name of communism, he is making the distinction that communism is not the USSR and the USSR is not communism. They are separate things, one an ideal of society and one an attempt to carry it out.
Documentary excerpt on Gorbachev's policies

The Fall of the Berlin Wall

The fall of the Berlin Wall was one of the hallmarks of the collapse of the Soviet Union, as the Iron Curtain began to lift in certain parts of the Soviet bloc. East and West Germany had been separated physically since 1961, isolating Eastern Germans from German cultural reconstruction. With the opening of Hungary's and Czechoslovakia's borders in 1989, however, a mass exodus of East Germans began; in an attempt to prevent the state from collapsing, the government (weakened by movements abroad such as Solidarity) announced the opening up of travel between West and East Germany. When the an East German spokesman announced that travel between the states could begin directly, a jubilant crowd overwhelmed the checkpoints and was soon climbing and destroying the wall, bringing down the most potent symbol of Soviet control and uniting Germany once again. Although the allowance of travel was meant to stop-gap the decline of East Germany, the small crack instead opened the floodgates, and the government collapsed soon after. East and West were free to mingle once again, to bring together Western culture and Eastern communist isolation to create a uniquely postwar German mindset and identity. Two very different experiences came together to form a new Germany.
BBC Article
ABC Report

p. 1029-1037

The crushing of the Prague rebellion as a sign of the Soviet Union's collapse is an interesting one, as it demonstrates the threat to tyrants everywhere. You will always be threatened by insurrection: if you deal with them gently, they will take advantage of you; if you deal with them harshly, they will internalize their resentment until it bursts forth with even greater force. The Soviet Union could not tolerate Prague because it might lead to the further destabilization of the Warsaw Pact. While the Brezhev Doctrine states that socialist nations cannot endanger international socialism, it was ultimately the USSR that decided what was best for international socialism, which turned out to be directly correlated (in their eyes) to the strength of the USSR. But the widespread, fast-growing nature of dissent proved too irrepressible for the Soviets, and the threat from within combined with the threat from without was doubly dangerous. The harsh response to Prague's liberalism was a symbol to the Soviet bloc and the world of the limited tolerance of the USSR for opposition to socialism within, but it also furthered the exposure of the state as a tyrant and contributed to the allegations of protestors.
The Prague conflict is discussed in Rock 'n Roll, a play by Tom Stoppard. He mentions frequently The Plastic People of the Universe, whose music became a symbol of resistance in Prague.

You Can't Handle the Truth

The Battle of Algiers is a fascinating film that I have wanted to see for quite some time, but somehow never got around to viewing. The clip we watched in class today shows a universality about questions of morality in conflict, in the 20th and 21st centuries at least. It reminds me of that famous speech from A Few Good Men, where Jack Nicholson explodes at Tom Cruise, laying out the line between civilians and the military. The military men portrayed here see torture and violence as routine, very necessary parts of their operation. We don't want to dirty our hands with this work, but it has to be done. They want leave to do their jobs, to defend and protect, by any means that is both possible and effective. So do we let the military commanders define their own moral code, if we have no comprehension of their true situation or what life-or-death decisions they are making? If you want to stay in Algeria, the colonel says, you must accept the consequences. If you want a secure America, he says, you must be prepared to give up some notion of freedom. Legality is not a top priority in a war zone, especially when the other side is using similar or worse methods. They are doing their duty as they see fit, unpleasant as it is to the rest of us. Watching these videos, I can't help but feel that this is still wrong, completely unjustifiable, but what do I really know about it? How would I act in the same situation? Morality becomes gray when survival and duty are on the line.

Berlin School of Electronic Music

A significant part of 20th Century German electronica seems to stem from this Berlin School of Electronic Music, a specific sound characterized by extremely long, flowing songs that sound "spacey" and alien started in the 1970s, emerging from the Krautrock movement of the 1960s. Krautrock signified a shift in the notion of German identity, as musicians soaked up what they learned from rock and roll and sought to create a distinctly German, post WWII sound. It was for the most part contained to West Germany. The Berlin School was the result of more bands experimenting with melodic lines and sequencers. Tangerine Dream is a popular and influential band that falls into this category. It contributed to the sound of the New Age and ambient genres. Notably, the band is well-known for touring with the then newly developed Moog modular synthesizer, which allowed it to have direct control over its sound by modifying the sound waves through modules, meaning a much larger variety of sounds and notes were possible. Though fiddly and difficult (check out these pictures), the Moog was among many synthesizers that revolutionized sound for electronic musicians. This was particularly true in Berlin, where the developing electronic music scene demanded new ways of synthesizing music for unique sounds.

What I Learned in the Gulag

This reading intrigued me greatly because of its combination of casual, brutal violence with a lofty philosophical discussion. I find Solzhenitsyn's conclusions about human nature astonishing for the mere fact that he came to them at what must have been the lowest point of his life, facing starvation or a cut throat in a wretched prison cell in Siberia. Yet he sees that there is good inside every human being, just as there is evil. The point of life and religion is the struggle to control that evil, but all human hearts have the potential. It seems that oftentimes desperate circumstances bring out the worst in people: starvation means stealing bread from another, cold means taking another person's shoes. Self-preservation trumps any moral code. Solzhenitsyn, however, only sees the universality of good and evil because of his desperate circumstances. Clarity came to him through intense suffering, a remarkable achievement. In a hospital where his companion is beaten to death, he believes that "even within hearts overwhelmed by evil, one small bridgehead of good is retained." The greatness of humanity, he seems to be saying, lies in its capacity for good even in the most awful of situations and perhaps the ability to believe in that capacity.
The Gulag Archipelago

Why didn't they nuke each other?

Mutually assured destruction.
The threat of total annihilation was too great. Even if one of the superpowers struck first, there was still a very good chance that the other side would not be so totally incapacitated that they could not inflict a potentially devastating retaliation. While in our simulation, there was a lot of angry noise being made, I think that in the actual Cold War, high tensions did not necessarily mean an unwillingness to talk. The concept of MAD entails the exposure on both sides of their weaknesses to nuclear attack, and neither the USSR nor the USA could afford to be entirely gung-ho with their nukes so long as they were vulnerable. Bluffing and rabble-rousing talk might have led them to the brink of nuclear war, as in the case of the Cuban missile crisis, but in the end, the Russians and the Americans backed down. The stakes were too great, and the crazed ideology not strong enough, for either side to sacrifice civilians, cities, and the stability and well-being of their country for the destruction of the other.

Nuremberg Trials

The discussion about the Nuremberg Trials today interested me, because it reminded me of my uneasiness about international law. I see an intense necessity for it: how else can we prevent wars and bring criminals to justice? And World War II demanded a new definition of crime for the sheer scale of human brutality. The killing of civilians has rightly become a crime against humanity, and the Holocaust is particularly shocking partly because it had little to do with actual combat. Murdering Jews by the millions can only be vaguely described as terror tactics, but they weren't meant to terrorize the Allies. Though we're uncomfortable with the "victors" deciding what is right and what is wrong, the horrible crimes involved were not just German crimes, but human ones, and thus the determination and trial of these crimes should involve the whole world. In that sense, I think the Nuremberg Trials were justified; they also brought to the front (through a sort of show, as we discussed) what the new definition of morality in war was going to be. We accept that this sense of right and wrong in combat is generally just and good. And yet. It seems hypocritical for the droppers of the atom bomb to define what a war crime is, and there is still the issue of imposed morality. Who gave them the right, or jurisdiction, to try these men? I am reminded of the ICC's arrest warrant for Omar al-Bashir, the leader of Sudan. It seems odd to me that this court in The Hague should have the authority to try a sitting head of state for war crimes, at risk of perhaps upsetting an uncertain peace process. But if the court does not bring him to task for his crimes, who will? Does the good of humanity necessitate such international courts? But who decides what is for the good of humanity?

p. 965-974

On the book's perspective in general: I was struck anew by how much World War II was (and is) seen as a battle between good and evil. The Allies are good: they hold out against the forces of darkness, their will cannot be broken. The inspiring picture on p.950 (also here) seems to me to show a bias towards the British people, illustrating their resilient spirit and refusal to give in. The Allies always fight courageously against the advancing Nazis and towns are "liberated." I wonder how much this portrait is over-simplistic. We want to believe that the British are only honorable fighters, to have heroes in this devastating war. The Nazis were monsters and killed millions more than the Allied powers, but we forget too easily the atrocities committed by the other side: the Dresden bombing, Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Both events were because of similar reasons to those used by the Axis powers, namely, terror. The killing of civilians cannot be justified on either side, and I think perhaps this war should be less the war that America loves to remember and more the war where we feel shame for our part in jump-starting nuclear warfare.

Germany Today?

Leigh's post about skinheads and Neo-Nazis brought to mind for me the backlash in Germany against all things Nazi and Hitler related. Nazi symbols, such as the swastika, are banned entirely, and Mein Kampf is not allowed to be published in Germany, though it is legal to own a copy. Holocaust denial is similarly a crime. It's a strange juxtaposition: we know that Holocaust denial is an entirely unethical (and irrational) stance to take, but what about free speech? Perhaps because Germany has a direct connection to a Nazi past, they felt they must overcompensate to gain the respect of Europe once more, or because they were afraid of slipping back into an older mentality. The symbolism of Germany banning such potent objects from their past seems more significant than if, say, the U.S. passed anti-Nazi laws as well. Things are a little more gray when you come to far-right-wing parties, however, that are associated with Neo-Nazism. I'm not sure which radical party ban Leigh was referring to, but according to this BBC article, the National Democratic Party won 9% of the vote and thus seats in a German state assembly. Representation is still regulated by election, no matter how radical.

Economics of Fascism

In our debate last week, we only briefly addressed the economics of fascism, which was apparently a strong point for the pro side. Fascism has no clear-cut economic platform, but any aspect of fascism stresses the primacy of the state over the individual. Though anti-communist, fascism and capitalism can coexist, but the capitalist system must be modified to a "corporatist" one. Especially true in Italy, the state plans economic goals and coordinates an economic strategy. Businesses are regulated by government into "confederations" which were controlled by government agencies; this business-government collaboration is very much an interventionist policy, as government control is necessary to make private interests serve the state's. Companies rely heavily on so-called "corporate welfare", where they are propped up by state subsidies. Importantly during World War II, the large amount of control the state had over the economy allowed it to change the economic focus to military spending. Close cooperation between the government and businesses made it easier for the state to regulate economic goals to further political ones.

Essay on fascist economics. Interesting article, but deviates in talking about how America still relies on fascist economic principles: "Are Internal Revenue Service agents really our 'servants'?"

p. 926-936

The beginning of the pervasiveness of American culture worldwide began in this era, with the advent of mass culture. Popular culture is one of America's biggest exports, and it started to become so in the 1920s and '30s, as American movies, music, and fashion spread across the Atlantic. The fears expressed by Europeans then are the same that are expressed today: that the U.S.'s mass culture creates uniformity and decadence. Europeans at the time were also worried about the destabilizing effect such uniformity could have on their old hierarchical orders. If everyone embraced such appealing materialism, what would be the result for the carefully cultivated traditions of the elite? There was a division between those who avidly devoured films and novels and between those who were frightened of what exported mass culture would change about what made their country unique. Yet we still see this struggle today, where American culture is popular in countries where the American government is detested and citizens mourn the loss of their traditional ways.

Summary of an NPR debate about whether Hollywood's undisputed global influence fuels anti-American sentiment abroad. One of the arguments is that is depicts an unflattering view of American life (violent, lots of sex, generally decadent) and Americans.

p. 939-953

The Spanish Civil War reminds me a little of the Greek War for independence in how involved foreign countries got involved in fighting on one side or the other. That war was one of Christian liberalism versus the Turkish invaders, but this war became, in the end, a proxy war. It was fascists versus everybody else that was left of the center political line. It remained ostensibly a civil war because no other governments were officially involved, but many of the Republican fighters were foreigners there of their own volition and the Soviets and Germans provided much of the firepower and practiced tactics that would come into greater prominence in World War I. This article from The Times of London was written April 28, 1937 and shows the horror that was felt (by the press, at least) at the mechanical nature the war had taken on. The writing here portrays the conflict of one of machines against humanity, especially with the detail of the bravery of the Basque clergy, as seeming approval of the Christianity of the Republican side. But such a horrific event cannot help but inspire such emotional coverage, even if ruthless efficiency in destroying a town does not lend itself to reports of a glorious struggle or deeds of heroism. It is interesting that Guernica is in Basque territory, meaning that the Basque autonomous government had, in fact, sided with the Spanish Republicans. Did they make themselves a target by voluntarily siding with the Spanish, or did they have no choice under the rules of their autonomy?

In a tenuous connection to Leigh's post about the dire state of German finances after the Great War, I would like to tell you a story that my dad told me the other day, which he heard from a former general manager of the organization involved. As we all know, Germany was required to pay war reparations after WWI. What is not so well known, however, is that they continued to pay them, "like clockwork," until the spring of 1945. So for the entire time that Europe was at war, Germany was continuing to dutifully pay off its debts. They did this through an institution called the Bank for International Settlements, established in 1930 for just this sort of purpose; it continues to act as an intermediary in international financial matters. The reparations were often paid in the form of gold bullion piled up in truck that were driven to a BIS office, often in neutral Switzerland, and handed over through them. Near the end of the war, the Allies were putting pressure on Switzerland to close its borders to Germans because they were afraid high-ranking officers would try to flee carrying valuable looted works of arts or large sums of money, often in gold coins. At this time, a German major was entrusted with the monthly task of driving the reparation trucks, so he drove up to the Swiss border. But the Swiss refused to let him in because he was trying to bring so much gold bullion out of Germany. He tried to convince them, even showing them an order from his superior officer that he was to deliver the gold to the BIS, but he was still refused entrance. Eventually, he drove back into Germany and went to the first branch of Deutschebank he saw, deposited all the money, put the deposit key in an envelope, and drove back to the border. He handed the envelope to the Swiss border guard and told them to deliver it to the BIS, as per their agreement. Months later, the delivery of bullion ceased when Germany collapsed, but throughout the war, Hitler's government oddly continued to honor the agreement that the former German government had made with the enemy.

Intellectuals in Russia

Dear Leigh, Comrade in Arms,
The place of intellectuals in the USSR seems to me to be an interesting one, because they were highly valued if they supported the regime and furthermore used their talents toward making the state stronger and sent to the Gulag if they expressed opposition. The intellectual elite is always an especial threat to totalitarian regimes because of the respect they command for their education. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn is one of the most famous examples: though he served in the Red Army during WWII (showing, perhaps, how the threat of Germany transcended political beliefs to some extent), he was later sent to the Gulag and exiled from the Soviet Union for writing comments critical of Stalin in a private letter to a friend. His threat to the state seems minimal, but the authorities cracked down hard and in the process created a worse enemy than they started with. His most critical books were written after his first-hand experience of conditions in the Gulag; whereas before he could only take issue with what he saw directly, the management of the Red Army, now he had been exposed to an entirely new aspect of the system: the prisons. And nothing says quite so much about a country as its prisons. (Read an excerpt from his excellent book, One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, here)

p. 919-925

Nazi propaganda emphasized a sense of nationalist duty for the every man. The German state was more important than anything else, both in the present and in the future. The blame is never thrust on the idealized people themselves; they are simply reminded that they must continue to do their duty and everything will turn out right. All rotten states of affairs are squarely thrust upon the enemies of capitalism, communism, and Judaism. If Germany has been corrupted, it is the fault of the outsiders who brought this upon the people, but now "we the people," the nationalist socialists, are called upon to drive them out. And as the pamphlet on p. 924 of our book shows, propaganda leads people to believe that they are besieged on all sides and that there is only one way out: national socialism. They cannot appeal to capitalism or communism because "Big capitalism and bolshevism work hand in hand; they are born of Jewish thought and serve the master plan of world Jewry." So not only are each of these enemies big and bad in their own right, but they're part of a huge Jewish conspiracy, working together to bring down the German farmer. This image of Hitler showcases many of the values of the Third Reich: Hitler is portrayed as the brave leader of the people, with Christ-like rays and a dove behind him, while his faithful, idealized legions follow him, the representation of the state, wherever he goes. There was a cult of the individual around Hitler, but the soldiers are all the same, reinforcing that true Germans support the state and that is their sole identification. Hitler's is supposed to be the one and only face of Germany.

p 903-913

No, Stalin's methods were not justified. Killing 54 million people is never justifiable, not even for what seems like necessary economic development. I admit that I don't see another way that Russia could have industrialized in time to meet the German attack, but preparedness for war strikes me not exactly the worthiest of goals. According to totalitarianism, the State is everything, and militarism is also high on the list. One of the major tenets of communism, it seems to me, is that the strength of the state comes from the strength of its people. Stalin's approach is only justifiable to himself under a totalitarian system, not a communist one. Industrialization and collectivization, while allowing the Soviets to beat off Germany, only marginally improved the lives of Russians. This article, while it contains some strange sentence structure, brings up a number of good points on both sides of the argument. It shows to me, however, that collectivization did not drastically change grain harvest outputs (indeed, famines resulted) or unify the peasants in nationalist feeling. The main positive point seems to be that it supported industrialization. And while industrialization made Russia ready for the war with Germany, the huge emphasis on large amounts of fast production in Stalin's Five Year Plan made meeting production targets more important than the goods themselves, in terms of quality and utility, so the system was not sound for the long term. Stalin sacrificed the welfare of the people for a long term goal of strengthening the state, but by compressing the long term into a short amount of time, he weakened his system.

p. 913-919

A quote from our book: "Activities like these [political rallies, youth marches, etc.] offered people a feeling of political involvement though they no longer enjoyed political rights" (917). The main thing fascism had to offer was an illusion: the illusion of a stable, strong state, the illusion of national unity, the illusion of efficiency, economic growth, and the return of traditional values. By promising all these things and keeping the people occupied with exercise programs for young people and parades, Mussolini could give them a feeling of being part of something larger and more important than themselves, even as they sacrificed all real participation in the country's rule. The ideology and rhetoric of the time changed, but the actual running of Italy remained mainly in the same hands, using the same methods. One of the successes of Italy is that while nothing much was different, people felt it to be different through their community organizations and family mobilizations for fascism. The new order changed only the face of the country, not its true foundations, but it hardly mattered. With all the outward signs of progress (rallies and parades), who could not believe that Mussolini was making a difference in Italy?

Lenin's Legacy?

I found Leigh's post on Lenin's legacy to be particularly intriguing, but I had a few small quibbles. While I agree that Russia has maintained the element of terror and government-sponsored assassinations throughout the years (consistent with the continued existence of an authoritarian regime), I don't know if enough of a direct connection can be made between intellectuals today and kulaks of the past. Journalists are being gunned down because of their efforts to criticize and reform the Russian state; the kulaks were simply more prosperous peasant farmers, among many peasant farmers who opposed Stalin's policy of collectivization. It became a catch-all term for agricultural enemies of the state, and you need not have committed a terribly treasonable act to be sent to the gulag as one. Though you could argue that the assassinations are an attempt to cow the group of intellectuals as a whole, they seem to me to be more directed at individuals and to be vague warning to all. The kulaks were "liquidated", evicted and deprived of their possessions until they failed to exist as a class or contribute to the agricultural economy. Millions were targeted as part of a larger goal of reconstructing the Communist state; the killing of journalists merely maintains the status quo in Russia today. So while I agree that violence is a traditional tactic of the Russian government, I shall be nit-picky and say that the correlation of kulaks and intellectuals may not be entirely an apt one.

Freud and mob psychology

I found both Jonathan's and Alex's posts about Freud and the mob to be interesting, but I find myself agreeing more with Alex than with Jonathan. The collective has a powerful effect on people, but I don't think it can fundamentally change human nature; it only brings out the worst (or infrequently, the best) in each of us. If the collective has the ability to make people's actions violent and aggressive, then doesn't each individual thus have latent elements of violence and aggression? Perhaps (and this might be a reach) mobs might bring out more of the unconscious than an individual acting alone. The constraints of society are lessened by the influence of others and mob psychology, and baser instincts dictate the individual within the group. I don't know if the decision to become "the savage wolf" is as conscious a decision as Alex portrays it, but I do think the presence of the mob lessens rational behavior and allows the unconscious more free reign.

Freud

Not having been in class on Wednesday, I have the powerpoint and the reading to go on in this post about Freud. I am puzzled by an aspect of these theories, as illustrated by this quote: "[Freud's theories] bought to fore a powerful critique of the constraints imposed by the moral and social codes of Western civilization" (Coffin, 856). I don't fully understand what the authors are saying here. That the constraints of society forced people to go mad? To sublimate and repress urges that, for true satisfaction, should not be sublimated or repressed? Though I don't know that much about Freud, it seems to me that his notion of the power of the unconscious and the ability of the superego to control it suggests that the power of reason and morality (as imposed by society) is stronger than natural impulses. It seems to support the power of human reason, not question it. But maybe the question is about whether reason is powerful enough, but about whether reason should be powerful enough. Are social restraints harnessing too much of what is natural in human beings, a natural power and tension that should be relieved and set loose? But wouldn't society break down without its moral and social constraints? How would removing them be a good thing? I would appreciate opinions.

p.855-862

The reading raised an interesting point for me, namely how new scientific theories such as those of Darwin and Freud were disseminated to the masses. It was not often that people read and learned from the sources themselves; more often they read about them in newspapers or heard about from others. Here we see the increasing influence of the much maligned "mass media", defining what the general public reads, hears, or thinks. Higher literacy rates did not mean that readers became more discerning, but in fact more voracious. Publications that were sensational, readily available, and cheap became the most popular, and it was these that defined mass culture through mass readership. What had started as an effective way to make money became an even more powerful tool for influence not only on culture but also on world affairs, such as when Hearst famously "started" the Spanish-American War because of some especially provoking journalism. The opinion of the public mattered a great deal to the success of businesses, governments, and ideas, and there was no better way of reaching the public than through the newspapers. However, there was no guarantee that the message would not be misinterpreted by the middlemen. Darwin and Freud's theories could be incorrectly reported by subjective writers who were interested in making a point, not scientific reporting. Unfortunately, perhaps, for some thinkers, it was writers concerned with selling papers who had the most influence on the public.

This week, we dealt with what social upheaval meant for politics in Europe at the time, specifically with the rise in success of the Socialist parties and more specifically with their role in Russia. The spectrum of political leanings in Russia was wide, but eventually it was the far left that won out. The discussion seemed to become less about whether to have a revolution but when and how, and it turned into Mensheviks versus Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks, with the future on their side, won the debate in both classes. The organizational skill and urgency of revolution that the Bolsheviks had, as well as fortuitous circumstances, made them able to push out the Mensheviks, even if their position might have made more sense, as Jonathan posits. I agree with David's comment about the Octobrists, that reform from within is much more stable than a complete overthrow. It resembles a benevolent dictatorship, yes, but there is less bloodshed. However, the loss of respect and love for the tsar made this approach difficult: Without the strong authority figure the Octobrists needed, the reforms would have been harder to push through. The further destabilization of the country during World War I opened the way for revolutionaries, not reformists.

p. 837-844

Ireland is a perfect case study of what I wrote about in an earlier post, the tug of war between reformers and radicals in trying to achieve common goals, here independent from Britain. The better organized militant groups were more appealing because they promised immediate action. They proposed fighting the battle on their own terms, a nationalistic point of view that many believed could accomplish what they wanted without compromise. The slow pace legislative reform did not endear it to angry people who were suffering under British occupation. Radicalism promised speed and a movement that was truly Irish, directed by Irish people towards Irish goals. They would not have to work through another country's legal processes, waiting on Britain to bestow something that they saw as a right. The militant nature of groups such as Sinn Fein, however, only served to frighten the British more as the two countries struggled to come to a deal about home rule. By combining militancy and politics, this party had strong support in Ireland itself for presenting a forceful front , but made outsiders wary and made the British even more unwilling to negotiate. But if the reformers had won out, would the war in Ireland have continued for as long and bloodily as it did? The British may have been able to hammer out a deal with reformers that they saw had similar values, and Ireland would have been able to break away as a country in its own right while still maintaining a powerful ally.

p. 823-837

The problem with socialism seems to have been that despite a shared focus on the situations of working-class people, there was too wide variety of perspectives for the movement to coalesce into anything other than a fractured minority. Early socialist political strength lay in national mass demonstrations and strong shows of solidarity that could challenge the industrialists' hold over politics. Later socialists became Marxists, arguing for revolution and democracy, but not necessarily through an already established legal system. More radical still, the Anarchists supported workers' rights, but believed in a completely different method of going about provoking a revolution, using violence and deliberate contempt for state institutions. By presenting so many conflicting ideas of how to proceed, the previous exuberance that had carried socialist parties to success dwindled, especially as it became clear that the workers' loyalties themselves were divided. The extreme spectrum of views that socialism encompassed allowed for radicals and reformers to operate within the same party, meaning that there was bitter disagreement over strategy that hindered the movement's effectiveness and ability to present a united front that would be respected nationally.

In class this week, we've mostly been looking at the whys and hows of imperialism, but also justification. That European governments would see their mission as a civilizing one and still treat native Africans as brutally as they did shocks us: how could they be so hypocritical? Nate's post on cognitive dissonance brings this up as well. Though it seems that imperialism was not universally supported at home, it was supported enough for the governments to continue. Imperialists lived with conflicting world views, driven by nationalistic and moralistic superiority, which Jonathan mentions as well. This gave the colonizers separation from their actions; they could do things "for the greater good," perhaps, because they felt themselves to be so unlike the ones they subjugated.

Also, I look forward to reading Leigh's next post on pan-Africanism and its origins in Ethiopia.

p. 806-816

Our book states that "Joseph Conrad in his Heart of Darkness publicized the arbitrary brutality and the vast scale of suffering," regarding the Belgian Congo specifically (810). But his novel is general and could be applied to imperialism everywhere. I start to wonder, what made the lot of the Congo so radically different from that of all the other European colonies? Wars were fought over colonies and control was taken with no regard for the native populations: farmlands were destroyed and the slave trade was "abolished," only to be replaced by a system of labor that was just as bad. The Congo was a perfect example of imperialism gone wrong, the extreme of brutality, but what is imperialism gone according to plan? To solidify your holdings abroad, you cannot let the territory have its own functioning government, which means that the government you set up or the control, economically or directly, you maintain will only be incidentally in those people's best interests. The goal of imperialism, while ostensibly seems to be "civilizing," cannot be other than the desire to strengthen one's own country and culture by spreading it. The rivalry between the European states drove the "scramble for Africa," and the subjugation of the people was the priority, not proper treatment.

p. 793-806

The sheer size of the 19th century British Empire and the lengths the British were willing to go to solidify their hold on territories is astonishing. To protect their economic interests, they went to war with whomever they pleased, and often won. The opium trade is a significant example, as it was manipulated to reinforce British interests in two separate countries with two different relationships with Great Britain: India was directly colonized, while China suffered from it indirectly. By bringing three countries together, Britain strengthened their empire by creating a dependency on what became a British product. Their monopoly showed a British talent for systematic industrialization, as northeast India was converted into a opium-producing machine where thousands were employed either growing poppy or curing and rolling the opium. Britain's empire essentially was built on drug money; the book states that "opium provided British India with more revenues than any other source except taxes on land" (799). Opium sustained the East India Company and British control in India, but it also closely tied it to China in a way other countries could only envy. The power of opium was, of course, in its addictive qualities; nothing creates an economic bond quite like something people can't get enough of, and the British knew this. It provided an entrance into China that no one else had, a connection with a market that the Chinese government could do little to stifle, so the British had a more direct route to the Chinese customers, rather than an official trade agreement. An addictive product and a market open to smuggling were a winning combination for British revenue.

This week we continued our discussion of nationalism, this time with expansionism and the balance of power thrown in. Bismarck had manipulated all three to his advantage: he expanded the Prussian empire by using nationalism to deflect suspicion that he was upsetting the balance of power by unifying Germany. The Crimean War was also a particularly good example of how the two clashed. We looked at the balance of power between nation states, but especially in the case of Russia, a balance was also needed to maintain internal peace. Russia had to let off this internal pressure by putting the focus on outward expansion. As we see in the Crimean War, this internal balance of power set off fears about the external balance of power in France and Britain; Russia learned the importance of the external balance of power at a high cost. This forced them towards a third balancing act, that of the internal versus the external. They recognized that they could not expand with impunity and attempted to compensate with rapid internal industrialization, something that probably eventually increased internal pressure instead of relieving it.

p. 762-767

The unification of Germany was by no means a certain event. There were many variables to prevent its occurrence: the diversity and traditional independence of the states, the reluctance of Europe to let a new, powerful state upset the balance of power, Austria fighting for influence and control in the same sphere. Bismarck's masterful planning and twisting of situations to his own advantage led him to a top-down approach. He started wars and played on people's fear and nationalism to create a Prussian empire; he brought states under a Prussian kaiser and government as a result of manipulating their fears about the balance of power. The southern German states chose to become a German Empire (under Prussian control) partly because they did not want to be invaded by France and partly because Bismarck had successfully appealed to their nationalism as offended Germans. With no Austria to protect them and the incentive to prevent France from upsetting the balance of power by "attacking" Prussia, the southern states let themselves be annexed into a Prussian empire, giving even more power to Bismarck.

p. 767-781

In the question of serfdom, our book says that it was agreed in Russia that the emancipation of serfs would lead to a modern state. It was supported both by westernizers and Slavophiles, the former because it would bring Russia morely fully into the Western liberal tradition, the latter because they so idealized peasant life. I think then it was more the desire for both, to be a Western state and an Eastern one, that led the tsar to emancipate the serfs in the manner that he did. It is remarkable that Alexander II chose to end serfdom, as it singled unmistakably a departure from the old ways of Russia and the tsar's dependence on the nobility. While he may have been worried about the serfs' effect on Russia's appearance abroad and ability to conduct successful wars, it is nonethless interesting that he should end it so abruptly, and by a special decree. At the same time, however, as we discussed in class, Alexander realized that it wasn't really intended to "free" the serfs, but instead to maintain the old system under a different name. Thus Russia hedged its bets, proving to the rest of Europe that it was a modern nation without slavery while still maintaining its old reliance on the nobility. The abolition of serfdom allowed the Russians to look upon themselves as an Enlightened state, instituting reforms that had no real meaning as they had in the past under Catherine the Great. They could combine their history of nobility with an acceptance by the rest of Europe to get what they hoped would be the best of both worlds.

Mia's post about this week's theme of nationalism has led me to contemplate further why it is that the U.S.'s "melting pot" has always been considered one of its strengths. I agree that this country began its history with a Western European identity, which successive waves of immigrants were gradually assimilated into. But these days, the analogy of a salad bowl as been put forth as more accurate. The sheer size of the US and its ability to have space enough for everyone who wishes to come allows for more wiggle room as different groups--religious, ethnic, political--settle in. I would say that the concept of the United States is a work in progress, and that's what makes us different. Our Constitution was designed to be changed and amended according to changing needs as the country developed. It is constantly be re-worked, as we have seen with the election of our new President, and that is a process that all Americans can contribute to. We are shaped by our immigrant citizens as much by our Daughters of the American Revolution. As we said, nationalism is the love of the idea of a nation. "America" still stands for something to its citizens (if not to the rest of the world), namely democracy and rights. Call me idealistic, but I think that is something that people from all walks of life can share.

Regarding Italian Unification (p.754-762)

I was impressed by how simple the book made the success of Italian unification seem. Cavour and Garibaldi had such apparently different ideologies and strategies that it is difficult to see one submitting to the other. And yet, that is what occurred. The crafted conservative state won the day, and the result seemed to please the Italians involved. Each of the major players' movements depended upon the other: without Garibaldi to weaken French control in the south, Cavour would never have entirely unified Italy. Without the scrupulously planned expansion of Piedmont-Sardinia by Cavour in the north, Italy would not have had a sovereign or a government ready for rule after unification, or its large territory in the north. Their collaboration, the popularity of the cause, and the universal acceptance of Victor Emmanuel greatly smoothed Italy's nation-state path. Garibaldi had the popularity and the troops to perhaps try to further Mazzini's populist republican dreams, but it turns out that he was a pragmatist. He remained faithful to the idea of nationhood and actually gave up his power to see that happen. Cavour, as the book states, "preferred that Italian unification happen quickly...without domestic turmoil or mess, unpredictable negotiations with other Italian states" (762). Remarkably, he got his wish. His plan went according to plan, even with the tricky variables of French unalliances, Austrian encroachment, the Pope, and Garibaldi. Though the more rural south resented how the government was situated in and mainly concerned with the north, the type of government and the idea that Italy should, in fact, be unified, seemed to have been more universally accepted than not. The main difference lay in the style of achieving such a government.

Reading 732-742

The contrast between France's revolutions and England's reforms shows through the way their respective governments dealt with radicals marching in the streets. The book states that during the revolution of 1830, "three days of intense street battles followed in which the revolutionaries, fight behind hastily constructed barricades, defied the army and the police, neither of which was willing to fire into the crowds" (732). The apparent reluctance of these forces to use violence meant that the revolutionaries, who did not shy from fighting, had the upper hand in the streets. Their civilian status protected them, and they did not fear government authority, making the revolution moderately successful. Government authority in Great Britain, however, carried much more weight among radical fighters. The militia cavalry charge at St. Peter's Field in 1819, which resulted in civilian casualties, as well as the Six Acts, which restricted freedom of speech and assembly, shows that the British government was much more willing to crack down swiftly and harshly on radical elements and then gradually reform once the situation was contained. Government forces then seemed to inspire much more fear, as in the Chartist movement. The mobilization of troops under the famous Duke of Wellington to prevent a march on Parliament forced the Chartists into second thoughts: "Rain, poor management, and unwillingness on the part of many to do battle with the well-armed constabulary put an end to the Chartists' campaign" (736). The discipline of the government forces made them a much more formidable foe.

In the Depths of Despair

An interesting thing about this post and its subsequent comments is the idea of how, even if you invest in your work to lead a more comfortable life, you are obliged to succeed according to the desires set forth by society. There are very few people who work solely for themselves, with no hint of outside approval- it is simply too uncomfortable, and the sort of socially mobile society we live in was built around human needs for security, as Declan said. There is a specific vision of success that we work for, a vision that can "blind" us from seeing how we truly live. To a certain extent, however, we can only be fooled by a false vision for so long.
"He would be too blinded by opportunity to note or care about his state of being. Furthermore, even if he did take note that he lived a miserable life devoted solely to wage labor, he would be able to justify this life in his belief that he will soon be rewarded for his labor with a more stable and pleasant position in society." Marx believed that the workers would come into a self-consciousness, where they could see the true slavery of their existence. If the worker has been pushed to edge of his tolerance, and is truly working for subsistence with no hope of promotion, then there must come despair and an attempt to change the system. There is no hope of a reward in a wage labor system, only the survival from day to day. If conditions hit rock bottom, a situation I personally cannot even imagine myself in, ambition to succeed with the system as is will falter, and the urge to reform the system (or even replace it) will grow. The scenario you put forth can only work if people believe that there is a way up. If they see no way up, they have nothing to lose.
"When work is seen as a means to an end, the workers labor will seize to be Marx’s “forced” labor but instead be voluntary labor, as the worker imagines his labor helping fulfill his vision of a better life." I think the key word here is "imagines." If the vision that the laborer sees turns out not to be real, will he not in turn be disillusioned? I am not arguing that a revolution is inevitable, but I do think a situation where society is not fluid and does not even appear to yield to amibition should be more carefully considered. Americans have their Dream, but others may not.

Metternich's Peace

With regards to Laura's post about Metternich's desire for peace, I would say that "peace" is an imprecise word to use on Coffin's part. Metternich was concerned with maintaining a conservative status quo and the balance of power among the powerful European states. Napoleon and his conquering ways had gravely upset that balance, and the purpose of the Congress of Vienna was to bring the countries back into alignment. While some part of it may have focused on punishing France, they were still allowed a relatively moderate settlement; what was more important was not provoking a French backlash. France was put back in its place, but was still necessary to sustain equilibrium.
Metternich wanted the balance of power to come from legitimate rulers, who claimed the throne by heritage and tradition, and if that legitimate power was threatened, he believed strongly in intervention, which would of course require a military force to suppress the revolt. He saw the need to, as the book says, "keep a firm grip on domestic affairs," a turn of phrase that does not suggest the sedateness of peace, but active participants always in military readiness. Peace is not a dynamic enough word to describe the fluctuations of power that Metternich would have recognized as necessarily occurring if a balance were to be maintained in Europe.

http://letstalkaboutmeh.blogspot.com/

Karl Marx's theory of socialism

Marx's socialist theory portrayed communism as the ultimate resting place of a dialectical class conflict, rising from the capitalist revolution and collapse. Communism needs capitalism, just as capitalism needed feudalism. The new society arises out of conflict and class struggles; a true communist state cannot be instituted by a body on high. The workers themselves must first come to terms with their situation as capitalism collapses: while a capitalist state still functions, the workers have no need to assess their state. Only when destruction is staring them in the face will they reorganize into something radically different. Communism as Marx sees comes from the collapse of the previous system, as the people of the state as a whole make a conscious decision to move away from the instability of capitalism. But they need to see that instability for themselves, they need to struggle in order to see the true value of communism. Also, Marx's theory incorporates a dialectical view of history, so it is interesting that he sees society as coming to a halt with communism. If the state progressed from feudalism to capitalism to communism, did Marx really think that the social and economic forces that drove history would disappear in a so-called perfect state? (Coffin, 722)

Greek Independence

The war for Greek independence from the Ottoman Empire was a conflict that encapsulated the coming together of different spheres in European life and how, despite wars and conflicts, there were a few traits that Europeans still shared. While they feared each other's territorial advances, they feared an "outside" force even more, and the Ottomans represented such a force to them. They banded together in sympathy for the Greeks, whom they viewed as of Europe, against a common enemy, the Turks. The war was seen as a defense of Western civilization, so it is no surprise that poets and painters such as Byron and Delacroix participated in the conflict or immortalized it in art. The Romantic culture of the time fostered sympathy for the Greeks because of the shared artistic and cultural history, a history that Europeans in general embraced as generally European, and not separated into countries or territories. The Greeks were heavily supported by volunteers because their cause was just European enough to warran it: they had the same religion, a shared culture, and a common enemy who was a threat to European territory.